The Unstructured Conference





CFA:
We welcome submissions related to the conference theme–unstructured content– especially those addressing one or more of the research questions below. Submissions of anonymized abstracts of 500–1000 words for 45 minutes presentations should be made by 15 February 2016 to theunstructuredconference@gmail.com. Notifications of acceptance will be sent in early March 2015. Some support for travel will be available.
Date:
22-23 April 2016
Venue:
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ
Speakers:
Justin Bledin & Kyle Rawlins
Kit Fine
Jeff King
Friederike Moltmann
Sarah Murray
John Perry
Susanna Schellenberg
Robert Stalnaker
J. Robert G. Williams
Stephen Yablo
Conference website:
Organiser:
Andy Egan (Rutgers), Dirk Kindermann (U Graz), Peter van Elswyck (Rutgers)
Contact:
dirk.kindermann[at]uni-graz.at
Description:
Conceptions of unstructured content take contents to be sets of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions (or functions from such things to truth values). In recent years, a great variety of new conceptions of unstructured content have been developed and applied, often with great formal ingenuity. Debates on relativism and context-sensitivity more generally, on expressivism, de se attitudes, counterfactual attitudes, vagueness, truthmaker semantics, and many more bear witness to these developments. At the same time, not as much attention has been paid to the philosophical foundations of unstructured conceptions.
In sharp contrast, proponents of structured propositions have recently spent a great amount of their time developing and clarifying the foundations of their conceptions in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. This conference encourages new reflexion on the foundations of unstructured conceptions of content, the availability of existing foundational stories to new technical conceptions, the competitiveness of unstructured conceptions vis-a-vis structured conceptions as well as the relationship between the two conceptions. It also aims to establish renewed dialogue between, on the one hand, proponents of structured conceptions and of unstructured conceptions and, on the other hand, between proponents of the various conceptions and applications of unstructured content.
(Non-exhaustive) list of topics: • Foundations in philosophy of mind of conceptions of unstructured content • Kinds of unstructured content & the nature of representation • Philosophical and / vs formal motivations for unstructured content • What are the relationships between structured and unstructured conceptions of content? Competition? Complementation? • Promiscuity on permissible sets of n-tuples: anything goes? (worlds-hyperplans, worlds-languages, worlds-standards of taste, …) • What is it that gets characterised, or modelled, by a set of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions? • What are outstanding problems of fineness of grain? • What progress has been made on the the problems of deduction / logical omniscience as they arise for unstructured content? • The role of (unstructured) content in semantic theory • Truthmaker semantics • Notions of hyperintensionality with unstructured content • Mental fragmentation/compartmentalisation • Metaphysical foundations of unstructured content • Possible worlds/points in the possibility-space: primitive or construed (e.g. out of structured things/sentences)?
Program:
TBA
Friday, 22 April
Saturday, 23 April







 

2nd Fragmentation Workshop: Developments in Philosophy and Psychology





CFA:
The 2nd Fragmentation Workshop: Developments in Philosophy and Psychology is organised by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on May 6-7, 2016. We welcome submissions of anonymized abstracts of 500–1000 words for 45 minutes presentations on any aspect of the workshop topic — see below — made by 28 February 2016 at fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.
Date:
6-7 May 2016
Venue:
Karl-Franzens-Universität, Institute of Philosophy, Heinrichstr. 26/V, 8010 Graz, Austria
Keynote speakers:
Dan Greco (Yale), Agustín Rayo (MIT)
Organisers:
Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann
Contact:
dirk.kindermann[at]uni-graz.at
Description:
Fragmentation, or compartmentalisation, is roughly the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. This notion of fragmentation has been developed and employed in the work of Cherniak, Lewis, and Stalnaker, and has more recently been advertised by philosophers such as Egan, Elga, Greco, Rayo, among others. Despite great advances, many fundamental questions regarding the status of the fragmentation hypothesis, its explanatory benefits, and the details of a fleshed-out theory of fragmentation remain open. The objective of this workshop is to investigate ways of developing the fragmentation hypothesis and to evaluate its explanatory merits and limits.
(Non-exhaustive) list of topics: • What is a theory of fragmentation? • What are the main motivations for fragmentation? What are its main problems? • What speaks in favour of realism about fragmentation? What reasons are there for anti-realism, or eliminativism, about fragmentation? • Which views of belief are compatible with fragmentation? • Is the reference to other attitude types (e.g. Tamar Gendler’s alief) or to more subtle distinctions (e.g. Brie Gertler’s beliefs vs. judgments) explanatorily equivalent to fragmentation? • How does Davidson’s notion of “mental division” relate to fragmentation? • What is the relation between fragmentation and memory? • What is the relationship between fragmentation and dual-process theory? • What is the relationship between fragmentation and the modularity of mind? • Do empirical studies on memory, or other cognitive aspects, support the fragmentation hypothesis? • Can a theory of fragmentation help us solve some of philosophy’s perennial problems and puzzles?
Submission:
Submissions of anonymous abstracts of 500-1000 words (exclusive bibliography), prepared for anonymous peer-review, in pdf format should be sent to fragmentationproject@gmail.com by 28 February 2016. Authors will be notified of decisions by 15 March 2016. Please indicate in your email the title of your paper. Some support for travel and accommodation might be available.
Program:
TBA
Friday, 6 May
Saturday, 7 May







 

Graz Young Epistemology and Philosophy of Logic Workshop





Topic:
Communication and Inference
Date:
28 November 2014
Venue:
University of Graz, Hauptgebäude, Universitätsplatz 3, Room 01.18 (1st floor)
Organiser:
Dirk Kindermann
Contact:
dirk.kindermann[at]uni-graz.at, dirk.kindermann[at]gmail.com
Program:
Friday, 28 November 2014
9:30 - 10:40
"Recommending"
11:00 - 12:10
"Logical Norms and the Epistemic Paradoxes"
12:10 - 2:10
LUNCH
2:10 - 3:20
"What is a Fixed Term?"
3:35 - 4:45
"Assertion, Contextualism, and Epistemic Goals"
5:05 - 6:15
"The Generating Knowledge Account of Assertion"
8:00
DINNER
Restaurant "Speisesaal" (Grieskai 4-8)







 

Graz Epistemology Workshop 2014




Date:
20 & 21 June 2014
Venue:
University of Graz, Department of Philosophy, Heinrichstraße 26/V, room UR 09.51 (5th floor)
Organisers:
Dirk Kindermann, Marian David, with the help of Melanie Deisinger & Raimund Pils
Contact:
dirk.kindermann[at]uni-graz.at, dirk.kindermann[at]gmail.com
Program:
Friday, 20 June 2014
10:00 - 11:30
"Paradox and Disease"
11:50 - 1:20
"Minimal Externalism"
1:20
LUNCH
3:10 - 4:40
"Appealing to Intuitions and Constraints on Evidence"
5:00 - 6:30
TBA
8:00
DINNER
Restaurant "Laufke" (Elisabethstrasse 6):
Saturday, 21 June 2014
9:30 - 11:00
"Beyond Functionalism"
11:20 - 12:50
"Disagreement and Epistemic Relativism"
12:50
LUNCH
2:40 - 4:10
"Knowing and Checking"
4:30 - 6:00
“This sentence is not scrutable”